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Dinosaurs should die. This lesson we have learned over
and over again. And innovators should resist efforts by
dinosaurs to keep control. Not because dinosaurs are
evil; not because they can't change; but because the
greatest innovation will come from those outside these
old institutions. I - Lawrence Lessig

INTRODUCTION

I.

Lessig has done more than simply observe cyberspace from the rarified air of the ivory tower. On
an increasingly frequent basis, he has sallied forth
as a cyberspace freedom fighter in a war where
courtrooms are battlefields. 3 His foe: the "dino4
saurs" of Hollywood and the recording industry.
Reflecting Lessig's growing activism, his new
book, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in

Lawrence Lessig, a Stanford Law School professor, is indisputably one of the greatest American
theorists thinking and writing about the new challenges of digital technologies. 2 In recent years,

a Connected World, aspires to be far more than just
the latest academic theory on the regulation of
cyberspace. The Future of Ideas is a manifesto for
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case, especially Lessig's influential amicus brief. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lawrence Lessig, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.
Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), availableat http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/con tent/testimony/ab/ab.pdf.
More recently, Lessig has embroiled himself in the copyright
wars. He has mounted two constitutional challenges to the
1998 extensions to the copyright term that were enacted as
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. Lessig argued one of these challenges in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on behalf of Internet publisher Eric Eldred. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255
F.3d 849 (2001), cert. granted, 151 L. Ed. 2d 966, 122 S.Ct.
1062, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 640 amended, 152 L. Ed. 2d 115, 122 S.
Ct. 1170, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1182 (2002). A second challenge
to the 1998 term extension amendment, Golan v. Ashcroft, has
been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with Lessig's name listed on the complaint as one of the
plaintiff's attorneys. Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, No. 01-B1854 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2001), available at http://
eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.html (making a constitutional challenge to Section
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act that restored
copyright protection to some foreign works that had fallen
into the public domain). Lessig's cyberactivism is also manifested through his work for two academic entities that are
both involved in many legal battles over the regulation of
cyberspace: The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard Law School (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/) and
The Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society
(http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/).
4 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 176 (making the stark statement
that "[d]inosaurs should die").
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I Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the
Commons in a Connected World 176 (2001) [hereinafter
Lessig].
2
Lessig, a former law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia, as well as to the influential Judge Posner on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has taught at
four of the law schools that are currently ranked in the top
six law schools by U.S. News and World Rep. (Harvard, Stanford, Chicago and Yale). Schools of Law: The Top Schools, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 15, 2002, at 64; see also Lawrence Lessig, Curriculum Vitae, at http://lessig.org/bio/cv/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2002). Lessig has a stellar reputation as a
cyberlaw theorist. In May 2001, BusinessWeek Online ranked
Lessig as one of the top 25 "most influential people in e-business". The e.biz 25: 25 Leaders for a Dangerous Time, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_20/b3732602.htm (May 14, 2001). Shift Magazine
named Lessig an "innovator" in 2001. The Innovators: Lawrence
Lessig, SFHnr.coM, http://www.shift.com/content/9.1/91/
1.htmi (last visited Apr. 11, 2002). Lessig has published
widely on the issue of the regulation of cyberspace. A list of
Lessig's articles, books and other publications are online at
(last visited Apr. I1,
http://lessig.org/content/articles/
2002).
3
Many readers will be familiar with Lessig's assistance to
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson in the Microsoft antitrust
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the fight against the "dinosaurs." Lessig views his
"dinosaur" opponents as an ancien regime benightedly using law as a weapon against innovation and
creativity, the lifeblood of the Internet's technological revolution. 5 Blithely disregarding the historical realities of the period when the real dinosaurs roamed the globe, Lessig employs the somewhat pejorative phrase "dark ages" to refer to the
time when the "dinosaurs" held sway (the period
before the Internet became mainstream). 6 Selection of this historical analogy suggests that Lessig
views himself as a crusader. 7 Accordingly, The Future of Ideas is liberally sprinkled with activist language like "resist" and "the struggle."8
Lessig's struggle against the dinosaurs is heating up. The latest front is the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorarion Feb.
19, 2002 in Eldred v. Ashcroft, argued by Lessig
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 9 The Court's decision to review Eldred v. Ashcroft makes The Future of Ideas an extremely timely and important book for anyone
with an interest in the future of cyberspace. The
Justices of the highest court in the land will rule
on the validity of at least some aspects of the argument set out in The Future of Ideas. Any Supreme
Court ruling on the regulation of cyberspace will
set a course that will be hard to undo.
This review's brief summary of The Future of
Ideas will undoubtedly fail to do justice to its elegance and eloquence. In keeping with its populist
aim of recruiting supporters for the "struggle,"'10
The Future of Ideas eschews the dense prose that
too often bloats the pages of law reviews. Lessig
employs a refreshingly simple and hip style, helpfully providing clear intermediate summaries for
each step of his reasoning.
Lessig's argument in the Future of Ideas is ambitious and complex. It builds on the argument set
out in Lessig's 1999 book Code and Other Laws of
5

Id. at 6-11.

6

Id. at 104; see also WILLIAM

MANCHESTER,

A WORLD LIT

ONLY By FIRE: THE MEDIEVAL MIND AND THE RENAISSANCE,
PORTRAIT OF AN AGE 3 (1993) (noting that the phrase "Dark

Ages" is offensive to many medieval historians).
7 See, e.g., NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY (1996)

358-60 (describing the 200 year history of the Crusades between 1096 and 1291, following the Dark Ages). By drawing
this historical parallel, I do not seek to contend that Lessig's
conduct as a cyberspace activist has any parallels with the
worst of the medieval crusaders' excesses, only that he shares
their zeal and fervor for a particular cause.
8
9

LESSIG, supra note 1, at 6, 11 and 146.
See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reh'g
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Cyberspace."I In Code, Lessig argued that the "nature" of cyberspace was not immutable or absolute, but was dependent on its architecture, or
computer code. 12 He also contended that the design of this architecture had profound effects for
liberty in cyberspace. In Code, Lessig chronicled a
shift in the Internet's architecture toward an "architecture of control."' 13 He argued that the result
of this shift has increasingly reduced liberty in
cyberspace. 14 Now, in the Future of Ideas, Lessig
shifts his focus away from the problem of liberty
to consider the impact of the architecture of
cyberspace upon innovation and creativity. He
maintains that the evolution in the Internet's architecture toward technologies of increased control has been supported by both law and policy
makers and threatens the innovation and creativity that flourished as a result of the Internet's original architecture.15 Of special concern to Lessig is
the deployment of technical controls by broadband Internet access providers, especially cable
providers.' 6 He is also concerned about the expanded scope of intellectual property law applicable to Internet content. Lessig believes that too
many people are oblivious to these threats to innovation. He urges his readers to join his crusade
to take action, warning that it will soon be too late
to respond.
Lessig's attempt to develop a unified theory for
the regulation of something as intangible and
conceptually unwieldy as cyberspace is truly impressive. Yet, as Lessig himself admits, his theory
is, at least to some extent, a prediction of the future and as such, lacks empirical support. After
reading The Future of Ideas, a number of nagging
questions remain, for this reviewer at any rate.
One such question is whether the entities deploying technologies of control will in fact ultimately succeed in consolidating their hold over
the market so that user choice to bypass those
denied sub nom.Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (2001), cert.
granted, 151 L. Ed. 2d 966, 122 S. Ct. 1062, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
640 (2002), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/
257/2422/19feb20021030/www.supremecourtus.gov/
orders/courtorders/021902pzor.pdf;.
10

LEssIG, supra note 1, at 6 and 258.

1 LAWRENCE LESSIC, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE].
12
Id. at 24-25.
13
14

15

16

Id. at 29.
Id. at 23, 29-30.
LESSIC, supra note 1, at 5, 10-11, 264-65.

Id. at 151-61.
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controls is lost. At a time when the future market
landscape for broadband is quite uncertain, it
seems to make sense to let the invisible hand of
the market have a chance. It also seems wise to
wait for more convincing evidence of clear market
failure before imposing regulation that may not
prove necessary.
Another question is the extent to which the
controls decried by Lessig will actually cause harm
to innovation or creativity, especially given that
the Internet has in fact been subject to more control over its brief history than Lessig admits in The
Future of Ideas. Lessig concedes that his account is
incomplete in that it fails to fully investigate all
the factors that may spur innovation and creativity. Although this is a difficult area in which to
conduct empirical research, it does seem somewhat premature to make the decision to still the
invisible hand while disregarding other factors affecting innovation. 1 7 Moreover, Lessig's account
of the increased control afforded by recent expansions to intellectual property law fails to give
much regard to the growing problem of the law's
lack of enforceability.
We are now living in an age of exploding technological developments that pose a serious threat
to the fundamental principle of the rule of law.
New technologies are providing more and more
ways to evade the reach of the law. As it has become increasingly clear that the law is unable to
fully control behavior in cyberspace, it also appears that many netizens do not respect or obey
the rule of law. 18 Lessig's argument seems to be
premised on the notion that intellectual property
law is an effective system of control, but that premise is open to question.
Perhaps even more significantly, Lessig's argument fails to give due regard to the ethical dimensions of innovation. He seems to assume that all
innovation is inherently good, and never really
pauses to consider whether some kinds of innovation may not prove beneficial to society. Indeed,

in describing innovations like Napster or My.MP3,
Lessig focuses entirely on their positive aspects
and freely admits that his theory ignores concerns
about their darker, potentially harmful uses.' 9
This approach seems unwise, when some innovations are clearly likely to cause serious harm to humanity. If we had now had the choice to invent
the atomic bomb for the first time, one would
hope that we would give more consideration to its
potential harm than was apparently given at the
time it was actually invented.20 Although the innovative digital technologies that Lessig lauds in The
Future of Ideas may not prove to be as potentially
destructive as the atomic bomb, it seems improvident to promote all such innovation in general
without giving serious regard to the potential
harm that may be caused by particular new technologies.
A greater focus on the ethical dimensions of innovation also raises questions about the value system underlying Lessig's theory. Lessig states that
his theory is founded on two fundamental values:
21
"law and economics" efficiency and democracy,
but neither of these justifications pays sufficient
attention to the morality of encouraging technological innovation, whether generally or for particular new technologies. Lessig seems to think
that a moral basis is too subjective to form an essential justification for his theory of cyberspace
regulation. 22 That attitude is open to question.
One approach to cyberspace regulation that merits more serious consideration is based on fundamental human rights. Such an approach is
founded on the principle that certain aspects of
humanity are universal, not simply personal.
Under a human rights approach to law, property
rights (including intellectual property rights), are
seen as essentially grounded in the duality of the
dignity of the human person and the essentially
social nature of humankind. Some of Lessig's
ideas about the limited nature of property are apparently consistent with a human rights approach

17 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DuKE L.J. 455, 464 (1991)
(commenting that many questions relating to the incentive

puter stores, using iPods, built-in CD burners, digital cameras
and the Internet. Leander Kahney, Smile, You're on Bootleg

theory of copyright "defy empirical analysis").
18 A clear example is the popularity of file-trading tech-

0,2125,50910,00.html (Mar. 8, 2002).
19 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 133.
20
See, e.g., Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us, 8.04
WIRED, Apr. 2000, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/8.04/joy.html [hereinafter Joy].

nologies to illegally share copyright music and movie files.
See, e.g., Brad King, File TradingSite in Crosshairs,WIRED NEws,
at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,47296,00.html
(Oct. 3, 2001) (reporting that over 3 billion files were
downloaded in Aug. 2001). Another example is the appar-

ently widespread theft of software from demonstration com-

Camera, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/moc/

21
22

supra note 1, at 92.
Id. at 11.
LESSIG,

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

to law, but questions remain as to whether his entire theory would be justified under such an approach.
Although the limited scope of a book review
does not permit final resolution of any or all of
the issues raised in the above paragraphs, this review will go on to explore them in a bit more detail, in the context of a survey of Lessig's argument's in The Future of Ideas. The survey will follow
the basic structure of The Future of Ideas, which is
divided into three parts, each becoming progressively bleak. Each part of The Future of Ideas is further subdivided into a tripartite analysis based on
the work of the NYU communications scholar
Yochai Benkler. 23 On Benkler's analysis of the Internet as a communications system, there is a
physical layer of the wires and computers connected to the network, a software (or code) layer
of protocols fostering communication of material
across the network, and a content layer comprised
24
of the material that travels across the network.
To Lessig, the extent to which the Internet is controlled at any given time must be considered for
each of these layers.
II.

THE CYBERSPACE "INNOVATION
COMMONS"

Lessig believes that the development and commercial deployment of the Internet amounts to a
technological revolution. He makes the sweeping
claim that "[t]his revolution has produced the
most powerful and diverse spur to innovation of
any in modern times." 25 But now, he warns, this

climate of innovation is under threat. As the Internet moves steadily towards the architecture of
perfect control that Lessig believes will eclipse innovation and creativity, both policymakers and
the general public stand idly by, fiddling while
Rome burns. Unless the current climate of apathy
can be overcome, Lessig fears that his "dinosaur"
opponents will triumph and the Internet of the
23
Id. at 23 (citing Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562-63

(2000)).
24
Id.
25
26
27

28
29

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
See generally id. at 20-99.
Id. at 23, 140.
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future will end up as "cable television on speed."' 26
In Lessig's dark vision, the Internet will amount to
just another Home Shopping Channel, albeit one
that is increasingly personalized. Although Lessig
does not offer any firm predictions for what will
happen if the dinosaurs are vanquished, he
predicts that it will be a far better outcome: "a
world of change" where creativity is free from ex27
cessively burdensome legal constraints.
The first part of the Future of Ideas, trendily titled DOT.COMMONS, introduces Lessig's concept of the original state of the Internet as an "innovation commons." 28 Lessig claims that the original architecture of the Internet was a "space
where creativity [could] flourish." 29 He argues

that although the physical layer was controlled (by
individuals, corporations and government), and
the content layer also was, at least to some extent,
controlled (by intellectual property law), the code
layer was free. 30 Unlike the telephone network or
cable TV, the original Internet had an end-to-end
("e2e") design founded on the "end to end argument" of MIT computer scientists Jerome Saltzer,
David Reed and David Clark. 3 1 According to Lessig, this e2e principle of network design meant
that the original Internet was a network lacking
centralized control over its users. The result of an
e2e architecture was a network that did not control what data passed across it, nor what applications could be connected to it.32
According to Lessig, when the Internet's original e2e architecture was combined with government limits on corporate control of the physical
layer (as a result of attempts to rein in AT&T's
monopoly power), the result was an environment
that fostered both a "commons of code" (software
applications built for the Net) and a "commons of
knowledge" (knowledge about the Net and code
running on it). 3 3 These two commons together

amounted to an "innovation commons" that allowed the development of new Net applications
without requiring the consent of the network or
30

Id. at 25.

31

Id. at 36-38; see alsoJ.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Argu-

ments in System Design (1984) 2, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277-88 (Nov. 1984) available at http://
web.mit.edu/Saltze r/www/publications/endtoend/
endtoend.pdf. An earlier version appeared in the SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYSTEMs

32
33

509-12 (Apr. 1981).
LESSIG, supra note 1,at 36-37.
Id. at 45, 49.
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any other gatekeeper. 34 As examples of the inno-

vation resulting from this e2e design, Lessig lists
the World Wide Web as well as open code projects
like the GNU/Linux operating system, the
Apache server and the Perl programming lan35
guage.
It is undeniable that open source projects like
GNU/Linux, Apache or Perl are examples of significant innovation. Lessig could have included
many other examples of significant open source
projects, like the Python programming language
or the GNU Emacs text editor.3 6 Yet Lessig's picture of a newborn Internet characterized by an
absence of control at the code level ignores the
existence of controls on the Internet's code level
for much of its history and thus leaves open questions about the necessary relationship between
openness at the code level and innovation.
Lessig is noticeably vague about the exact stage
of the Internet's history he means by the "original
Internet." He uses the phrases "cyberspace at its
birth" and the "original Internet" apparently synonymously, but neither phrase provides a precise historical context.3 7 It is not clear whether
Lessig thinks that the Internet was born in 1969,
when four host computers formed the original
packet-switched network known as the Arpanet,
or in 1983, when the Arpanet fully transitioned to
the TCP/IP host protocol, or in 1995, when the
Federal Networking Council issued a definition of
the "Internet" (as might be indicated by Lessig's
"Net95" moniker used in Code), or on some other
date. 38 Why this quibble about historical precision? Because the history of the Internet makes
clear that, for most of the Internet's early history,
its code level was not totally open. At code level,
the early Arpanet was subject to considerable government control. Users of the Arpanet were limited to certain university and industry Department
of Defense contractors.3 9 Other computer scien34
35

Id. at 40, 49.
Id. at 41, 54-56.

36 See Python Page at http://www.python.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2002), GNU Emacs Page at http://
www.gnu.org/software/emacs/emacs.html (last visited Apr.
11, 2002).
37
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 44, 121.
38
See Barry Leiner et al., A Brief Histoy of the Internet, at
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (revised
Aug. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Leiner]; see also LESSIG, CODE,
supra note 11, at 27 (the phrase "Net95" is not used in The
Future of Ideas, for reasons that are not entirely clear).
39
Michael J. Ferguson & Jean-Charles Grhgoire, A Short

tists and researchers could not get access to the
Arpanet. Demand for network access led to the
creation of other networks such as the U.S. Department of Energy's MFEnet for researchers in
Magnetic Fusion Energy, the National Science
Foundation's sponsorship of another network for
academic and industrial computer scientists
40
(eventually named NSFnet), Usenet and Bitnet.
Apart from Usenet and Bitnet, these networks
were all controlled at the code level in that they
were closed networks accessible only to certain
groups of researchers. 4 1 In 1985, NSF did open

access to NSFnet higher education users beyond
computer scientists, 4 2 but NSF continued to exer-

cise considerable control on NSF at the code
level, most notably prohibiting commercial use of
43
NSFnet until 1991.

If, as Lessig claims, technologies of control are
now being added to the Internet's architecture, it
is clear that the Internet's code level has only really been open for a relatively brief period of its
history. This is significant because it raises questions as to the causal relationship between openness at the code layer and innovation. Some of
the innovations that Lessig cites, such as GNU/
Linux, Perl or the World Wide Web were developed, at least in part, at a time when the code
layer was not completely open in that access to the
Internet was restricted to particular users. 44 Lessig's theory of an "innovation commons" based on
an open code layer is thus somewhat incomplete,
leaving unanswered questions about what level of
openness is required at the code layer for innovation to occur.
III.

COMPARING THE CYBERSPACE
INNOVATION COMMONS TO REAL
SPACE

Lessig's happy picture of the "original" Internet
History of the Internet 2, available at http://www.inrstelecom.uquebec.ca/users/mike/t230_01/iphist.pdf (Jan.
26, 2001) [hereinafter Ferguson & Grhgoire].
40
Leiner, supra note 38.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Ferguson & Grhgoire, supra note 39, at 3.
44
See The Timeline of Perl and Its Culture at http://history.perl.org/PerlTimeline.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002)
(stating that Richard Stallman's GNU open source project
was commenced in 1984 and that the first version of Perl was
released in 1987).
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as innovation commons is contrasted with constraints on innovation in real space in the second

part of the book. 45 This part, which Lessig calls
DOT.CONTRAST, is the shortest section of the
book, at only 38 pages. Its main function appears
to be to provide a transition between Lessig's
ideal of the cyberspace innovation commons and
his nightmarish vision of its imminent demise.
Lessig employs a flashback technique to make this
transition. He looks back to the "dark ages"
before the Internet became mainstream and describes what he sees as the constraints on creativity and innovation in the arts and in commerce
that were then in place. 46 He charges that in con-

trast to the happy ideal of the original Internet,
"[c]reativity in the dark ages lives in a world
largely without a commons." 47 To Lessig, the

main constraint on both the arts and commerce
in the "dark ages" was at the code layer, the layer
governing distribution of both artistic works and
goods or services. 48 Big corporate entities largely

controlled which of these could be broadly distributed. To Lessig, this was a significant constraint on creativity because, he argues, people
would not create or innovate if they could not be
sure of a market for their works or goods. 4" At the

content layer, Lessig views copyright law as another constraint on creativity in the "dark ages,"
but believes that, in theory at least, the constitutional limitations of the law (such as fair use and
the limitations on the copyright term) guaranteed
access to some creative works for "dark age" artists
50
who wished to build on them.
Lessig views these constraints in the real world
as basically justified by the physical nature of real
space and its scarcity-based economy. 5' He takes
great pains to establish that he is not opposed to
the free market or the ownership of private property. 52 But he does warn that the constraints on
creativity in real space are rising due to two ongoing trends. The first development is the spate of
big corporate mergers in the media industry (including news, publishing, broadcasting, film and
cable), which is leading to increasing constraints
45

LESSIG,

46

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47
48
49

50
51
52

supra note 1, at 103-41.

at 104-19.
at 115.
at 111.

at 111, 114.

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 103-04.
See id. at 6, 86, 115, 202.

at the code level of distribution. 53 While Lessig
does not attack the legality of this increasingly
concentrated control of the media industry by
fewer and fewer players, he believes that its result
is an unfortunate decline in diversity and quality.5 4 The second development is the "almost lim-

itless.bloating" of copyright law as it has been expanded in duration, application to different types
of subject matter, and the creation of new rights

55
for the copyright owner.

Lessig contrasts the growing constraints on creativity in the real world with the Internet innovation commons. He catalogues a series of innovations in cyberspace that he sees as examples of the
innovation in cyberspace that is attributable to its
e2e architecture. Such cyberspace innovations include new products, such as HTML books, digital
films or music lyric servers. 5 6 Another innovation
is the development of new markets, including a
market for online poetry, and new distribution
methods, such as Napster or My.MP3. 57 Even
more innovative, according to Lessig, are preference matching technologies like those employed
by Amazon.com. These can build customer demand for products rather than simply meeting
it.58 Lessig caps off his list of cyberspace innovations with a technology that he sees as "revolution[ary]": the development of peer-to-peer technologies like Gnutella. 5j9 Yet although it seems fair
to describe all of these developments as innovations, Lessig's argument that innovation in general should be protected by the law seems somewhat incomplete in that it does not fully confront
the serious question of whether such innovations
are socially beneficial.
Lessig openly admits that he disregards some of
the darker sides of the technologies that he lauds
as innovations. He acknowledges that many have
concerns over the threat to privacy posed by preference matching technologies or the possibilities
for piracy posed by peer-to-peer technologies, but
he ignores these concerns. 60 He states that he is
focusing only on the positive aspects of these new
innovations. But Lessig's Pollyanna approach will
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

118.
106; see also id. at 107-10.
122-26.
126-32.
132-33.
134-37.
133, 137.
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leave many readers with nagging questions. Isn't it
prudent to consider whether the negative aspects
of innovative technologies outweigh the positive
ones? Should we promote innovation in general
even if some innovative technologies may fail this
balancing test? Some thoughtful technologists,
such as Bill Joy, are increasingly concerned about
the ethical aspects of new technologies. 6 1 Joy
warns that some new technologies may pose serious threats to humanity and so we cannot afford
to ignore this issue. Lessig too blithely skates over
these concerns in The Future of Ideas. By focusing
on the threats to innovation in cyberspace, he
fails to devote enough attention to threats that
may be posed by innovation in cyberspace.
IV. THREATS TO THE CYBERSPACE
INNOVATION COMMONS
The final section, DOT.CONTROL, is the most
pessimistic section of his book and contains the
meat of Lessig's argument. Here he chronicles
how the "dinosaurs" are increasingly changing the
Internet at code level by developing technologies
of control. 62 Lessig believes that the addition of
these controls is leading to tragic results for the
Net by altering its end-to-end design. 63 He calls

64
this the "tragedy of the innovation commons."
Simultaneously, Lessig contends that the "dinosaurs" have also been threatening creativity and
innovation by successfully lobbying for more expansive intellectual property laws for digital content. 65 Lessig condemns the support that he
thinks Congress and the courts are providing to
these "dinosaurs." He warns that the combination
of law and technological control is leading toward
a system of perfect control that will undermine the
66
Net's innovation commons.
According to Lessig, this trend toward perfect
control is motivated by increasing market demand

61
62

Joy, supra note 20.
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 146.

Id. at 161, 175-76.
64
Id. at 175.
65
Id. at 179.
66
Id. at 180.
67
Id. at 147, 151, 154, 176.
68 In re Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable
Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of ProposedRulemaking 17 FCC Rcd,
4798,
33 (Mar. 15, 2002) available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_pubIic/attachmatch/FCC-0263

for broadband Internet access. Access through
telephone lines is too slow for many of today's Net
applications, driving a need for broadband access.
Lessig charges that broadband providers, particularly cable companies, are "dinosaurs" that are imposing technologies of control on Internet access.
He is concerned about the power of cable companies to close their "fat pipes" by allowing only se67
lected ISPs to access them.

Recent developments at the FCC might seem to
bolster Lessig's concerns about the power of cable
companies to close their pipes to competing ISPs.
In March, 2001, the FCC voted 3-1 not to force
cable operators to open access to their cables,
classifying cable broadband as an interstate "information service" rather than a "telecommunications service" or "cable service." 68 But the FCC's
decision has been challenged by a lawsuit brought
by the Media Access Project on behalf of Consumers Union, The Consumer Federation of America
and the Center for Digital Democracy. 69 Even assuming that cable companies have the power to
restrict access to unaffiliated ISPs, it is not at all
clear that they will in fact do so. As noted by the
FCC in its recent declaratory ruling, many of the
largest cable providers, including AOL Time
Warner, Comcast and AT&T, have all opened access to some unaffiliated ISPs, at least in some
markets.

70

Lessig has additional concerns about the power
of cable companies to control what passes across
their cables. He also accuses cable companies of
developing technologies that discriminate in favor
of proprietary content. 7' Moreover, he charges
that cable companies are already employing
gatekeeping technologies that impose controls on
what data can be sent or accessed across the
Net.7 2 Lessig describes these technologies of control by quoting a passage of more than one page
in length from a 1999 Internet publication by e2e
77Al.pdf.
69 Media Access Project Press Release, MAP Files Suit
Challenging FCC Internet Cable Ruling, at http://mediaaccess.org/press/march25release.pdf (Mar. 25, 2002).
70
Id. at
26-30 (noting that Time Warner was required
by the FTC to open access to multiple ISPs as a condition of
its merger with AOL, that Comcast negotiated an agreement
in February 2002, to provide two unaffiliated ISP services in
two markets, and that in March 2002, AT&T announced an
agreement to offer one unaffiliated ISP service in two markets).
71
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 156.
72
Id. at 156-57.
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designer Jerome Saltzer, "Open Access" is Just the
Tip of the Iceberg.73 This passage contains a list of
gatekeeping technologies that Saltzer claims are
being employed by cable companies: time limits
on video streaming connections, filtering,
prohibitions on home web servers and home networks and fixed backbone choice.7 4 However, Lessig himself does not appear to have carried out
any supplementary empirical research to ascertain
the extent to which cable companies are now imposing these limits for all users. A check with AOL
Time Warner Cable, one of the largest providers
of cable internet access services, on April 12,
2002, revealed that AOL Time Warner does not
impose many of these restrictions, including video
streaming limits, prohibitions on home networks
and filtering (other than for Spam), on residential customers. 75 AOL Time Warner does impose

size limitations on web sites for residential customers, normally permitting websites up to 5
megabytes and raising the limit to 10 megabytes
for an additional fee. 76 However, AOL Time

Warner permits individuals to host larger web
sites if they switch to commercial service. 77 AOL
Time Warner's policy appears to be directly contrary to Lessig's claim of a trend toward more control at the code layer by cable companies and
raises questions about the validity of this claim.
Moreover, although it is true that some cable
companies have imposed video streaming limits
on consumers, many content providers that Lessig
would class among the "dinosaurs," like Disneyowned ESPN, have strongly objected to such limits.78

Moreover, even if cable operators do in fact alter the Internet's e2e design, the extent to which
other types of broadband providers will in fact impose such design-altering controls on their subscribers is currently uncertain, as Lessig himself
admits. At the time The Future of Ideas was written,
73
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 156-58; see also Jerome H.
Saltzer, "Open Access" Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg, at http://

web. mi t.edu / afs/ athena. mit.edu / user/othe r/a/Saltze r/
www/publications/openaccess.html (Oct. 22, 1999).
74
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 156-58.
75 Telephone Interview with David Anzaldo, Customer

Service Representative, Time Warner Cable Road Runner
Commercial Services (Apr. 12, 2002).
76
Id.
77

Id.

See, e.g., Stefanie Olson, Battle Brews Over Web Streaming,
CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-26738.
html (last visited May 31, 2001) (describing a dispute be78

Lessig could not charge that DSL broadband service providers would limit access to their wires to
selected ISPs, because they did not legally have
the right to do so. 79 This looks likely to change.

On Feb. 14, 2002, after Lessig's book came out
and shortly before this review was written, the
FCC adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
"tentatively conclud[ing]" that DSL should be
classified as an "information service" rather than a
"telecommunications service."80 This reclassification will effectively deregulate DSL in that DSL
providers will no longer have to open their networks to competing ISPs. Lessig would no doubt
agree with consumer advocates such as Mark
Cooper, research director for the Consumer Federation of America, who has described the FCC's
move as "a drip, drip, drip that may take away the
Internet as we know it."81 But even if the FCC is
no longer requiring open access, it is not yet clear
that deregulated DSL providers will in fact close
their networks to competing ISPs.
As Lessig admits, the crucial issue here is not
whether some broadband providers may impose
controls in broadband access, but whether there
will be a concentration of broadband providers
who effectively foreclose user choice by imposing
such controls.

2

Lessig himself has advocated the

principle of "the least invasive regulatory response," albeit in a slightly different context. 83 Applying this principle, serious questions remain as
to whether it is wise, in an unsettled broadband
market, to impose regulation that may prove unnecessary if the market is left to its own devices. In
particular, the recent movement by large cable
service providers toward providing unaffiliated
ISP service suggests that Lessig's skepticism about
the power of the invisible hand to set things right
84
at the code layer may prove unwarranted.
Lessig's concern about excessive control by the
"dinosaurs" goes beyond control at the code layer.
tween Disney-owned ESPN and cable provider Charter Com-

munications over video streaming restrictions).
79

LESSIG,

supra note 1, at 155.

See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (released Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
80

FCC-02-42Al.Lxt
81 Jon Van, Consumer Advocates Blast BroadbandPlan, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 15, 2002, at 1.
82
LESSIG, supra note 1,
83

Id. at 248.

84

Id. at 162.
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In the final section of his book, Lessig also decries
changes at the Internet's content layer, namely
changes to intellectual property law. It is indisputable that, over the past decade, intellectual property laws applicable to digital content have been
broadly expanded. 85 Lessig shows how Congress

has significantly expanded federal copyright law
by enacting amendments such as the new anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Copyright
Millennium Act of 1998 and the twenty-year retroactive copyright term extension in the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.86
He also provides a lucid account of how the
courts have expanded federal patent law to permit both the patenting of software and business
87

processes.

To Lessig, the eagerness of both Congress and
the courts to widen the reach of intellectual property law was fueled by premature panic on the
part of "dinosaur" content owners and neglected
to take into account the simultaneous addition of
technological controls at the Internet's code
layer.8 8 Lessig argues that the U.S. Constitution
clearly provides that intellectual property law is, at
its essence, a balance, and that the expansion of
these dinosaurs' control has now pushed that balance completely out of alignment. 89
Lessig warns:
[a]nd while one cannot say in the abstract that increased control is a mistake, it is clear that we are expanding this control with no sense of what is lost. The
shift is not occurring with the idea of a balance in
the shift proceeds as if control were the
mind. Instead,
90
only value.

He stresses that he is no radical hacker seeking
the eradication of all intellectual property laws.
Rather, he warns that care is needed before piling
control upon control. Lessig's allegiance to some
intellectual property law is underscored by his
choice of Random House as publisher of The Future of Ideas. Random House is owned by
85 For a very readable, though highly critical, account of
copyright law changes, seeJESSIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
(2001); see also SIvA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How
IT THREATENS CREATIVTY

(2001).

86 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 187, 196-97.
87 Id. at 207-11; see, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
88

Id. at 179-80, 199.

89

Id. at 97, 105-08, 177, 187, 202-03.

90 Id. at 99.

91 See Steven Levy, The End of the Net, MSNBC.COM, available at http://thehacktivist.com/modules.php?op=

Bertelsmann, which as one of the "Big Five" record labels, would surely qualify as one of Lessig's
"dinosaurs". When asked about this apparent inconsistency in an interview, Lessig commented:
"That's a fair criticism. Here's one way to look at
it: [Bertelsmann is] working very hard to spread a
book that hopes to undermine their strategy."9 '
Lessig's account of intellectual property in The
Future of Ideas will leave many readers with additional questions beyond his choice of publisher.
One issue that Lessig fails to give sufficient attention is perhaps one of the most significant
problems for intellectual property law. This is the
issue of the enforceability of legal controls in an
age of rapidly growing technological power. It is
clear that many technologists are effectively
thumbing their noses at the courts by taunting
them with the power of such technologies to
evade the law. 92 A notable example is the DeCSS
litigation, where the trial judge, Lewis Kaplan, was
clearly deeply troubled by this situation. He
stated: "Defendants argue that an injunction in
this case would be futile because DeCSS already is
all over the Internet. They say an injunction
would be comparable to locking the barn door after the horse is gone. And the Court has been
troubled by that possibility. But the countervailing
arguments overcome that concern." 93 Yet even after Judge Kaplan's grant of injunctive relief was
affirmed by the Second Circuit, a simple Web
search confirms that DeCSS is still posted all over
the Internet.
Another example is the aftermath of the Napster litigation. Even though Napster itself experienced virtually total defeat in the courts, its soul
has risen like a phoenix from the flames in the
form of new decentralized peer-to-peer technologies like Gnutella, Kazaa or MusicCity.com that
many commentators believe are far less amenable
to legal control. 94 Even if the corporate entity
modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1 75&mode=
thread&order=0 (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
92
See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, NEXT: THE FUTURE JUST
HAPPENED 112-19 (2001) (noting how outsiders are ignoring
the old rules and "torment[ing]" the established corporate
insiders by developing technologies that, among other
things, permit massive evasion of intellectual property laws).
93
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
F.Supp.2d 294, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
94 See, e.g., Brad King, Napster Still Playing in Court,
at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/
WIRED.COM,
0,1285,48982,00.html (Dec. 10, 2001). This contention is being put to the test: the RIAA and the Motion Picture Associa-

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

loses a legal battle and is shut down, file trading
may well continue.9 5 New digital technologies
thus pose serious challenges for the rule of law in
our society, and it is unfortunate that The Future of
Ideas has not devoted more attention to this. Lessig's assessment of the expansion of intellectual
property is not framed in the context of these
threats to the rule of law in our society. When
considered in this way, the question of whether
the proper balance for intellectual property law
has become skewed is less obvious.
Because Lessig believes that the current state of
intellectual property law is seriously overprotective for digital works, he concludes by offering
some suggestions for reform. His copyright law
proposals would revive formalities that were removed from federal copyright law by the 1976 revisions. Untroubled by the fact that implementing
his suggestions would put the United States in violation of the Berne Convention, Lessig proposes
revoking the current rule that copyright rights accrue automatically on a work's creation and replacing it with a new registration prerequisite for
the accrual of copyright rights.9 6 On a valid registration, a copyrighted work would be protected
for a five-year term that would be renewable 15
times, each for an additional five years.9 7
Lessig also advocates changes to intellectual
property protection for software. He thinks that
the term of copyright protection for software
should be a maximum of ten years, and that the
deposit requirements for copyrighted software
should be changed to require source code to be
held in escrow until copyright expires, at which
point the source code would become publicly
available.9 8 Lessig also advocates the creation of
government incentives to spur gifts of copyrighted
works to public domain conservancies,'19 a system
of compulsory licenses for digital music distribution, 10 0 and limits on state contract laws and laws
tion of America sued MusicCity.com, Grokster, and Consumer Empowerment in October, 2001. Brad King, File Trading Sites in Crosshairs,WIRED.cOM at http://www.wired.com/
news/mp3/0,1285,47296,00.html (Oct. 3, 2001).
95
Id. It should be noted that in late March 2002, a Dutch
appellate court ruled that a Dutch licensor of Kazaa file-trading software was not liable for copyright infringement by
users of this software, though it is doubtful whether this
Dutch ruling will spearhead a similar trend in U.S. courts.
Brad King, The Kazaa Ruling: What It Means, WIRED.COM, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/O,] 283,51457,00.html
(Apr. 2, 2002).
96
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 250-51.
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protecting copyright protection systems if these
provide protections greater than would be allowable under federal copyright law. 10'
Lessig also suggests one major change to the
current federal patent scheme, namely a moratorium on "the offensive use" of business method
and software patents pending a PTO regulatory
review and regulatory impact statement that assesses the harm and the benefit to innovation that
is the result of current patent regulation.10 2 Beyond suggestions for the reform of intellectual
property law, Lessig also suggests changes to the
regulation of Benkler's physical and code layers of
the Internet.
At the physical layer, Lessig suggests building a
spectrum regime on the model of the original Internet's innovation commons. He advocates setting aside bands of spectrum at each spectrum
level as a commons, which would coexist with
other bands that would continue to be auctioned
as property. " Government should no longer be
able to hoard spectrum. To Lessig this is "obscenely wasteful."' 1 4 He also suggests that the government should spend resources on building an
information superhighway on the model of a real
highway by, for example, laying "dark fiber" that
is not earmarked for a particular service.10 5 He
thinks that all of these changes will further the development of competitive broadband providers,
06
and will ultimately further innovation.
Lessig also has suggestions for change at the
code level that he thinks would protect innovation. He advocates government encouragement of
open code. This encouragement should not be by
force but by example, such as replacing proprietary operating systems like Windows with open
source operating systems. 10

7

He also advocates

regulation requiring open access for broadband
Internet service providers.' 0 8
Lessig qualifies his proposals for reform as
Id.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
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"neither complete nor certain."'1 9 He says that he
is simply trying to prompt debate. Although a detailed critique of all of these proposals is beyond
the scope of a relatively brief book review, there is
clearly some question as to whether Lessig's proposals would in fact bring about the result that he
hopes. An example is Lessig's proposal for the introduction of an initial registration requirement
and the reintroduction of a renewal term system,
though expanded from one to fifteen renewal
terms. An obvious concern is whether a copyright
system incorporating these changes would end up
favoring Lessig's despised "dinosaurs" over individual authors and would fail to adequately protect or promote innovation. It seems all too likely
that the "dinosaurs" would use the stables of intellectual property attorneys at their disposal to ensure that they were in compliance with the registration and renewal formalities, while individual
authors without easy access to good legal assistance would be less likely to successfully protect
their works." 0 The imposition of additional formalities also seems likely to fuel an explosion of
copyright litigation over whether there has been
compliance with these formalities, as well as generating controversy over issues historically litigated but now largely resolved by statute for the
original 28-year single renewal term, such as the
date of vesting of the expectancy of a renewal
term in the author's grantee. II Another potential
problem with reintroducing formalistic renewal
requirements is that they may cause potential innovators to spend more time and energy on the
control of their intellectual property than actually
innovating.
But the question of whether a system promotes
109

Id. at 240.

110 Cf ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 356 (2001) (noting that the renewal obligation has been "a trap for all authors" and quot-

ing a statement made on the floor of the House of Representatives: "The renewal requirements are highly technical
and have resulted in the unintended loss of valuable copyrights. In addition to countless individuals who do not have
knowledge of the requirements, even famous directors such
as Frank Capra have fallen victim.").
111 See id. at 357. The problem of the date of vesting of
the expectancy of the renewal term, a question for which
there is conflicting authority, was relaxed in 1992 for works
published between 1964 and 1977 by the amended section
304(a) (2) (B) of the 1976 Copyright Act. This provision removed the requirement of filing a renewal registration by
providing for automatic renewal, but also provided for earlier

vesting if a voluntary renewal registration was filed. See 17

a larger quantity of innovation should not be the
only concern. As suggested above, the ethical
dimensions of innovation should not be disregarded. This consideration is relevant to the value
system underlying Lessig's theory of innovation.
Lessig states that his theory of innovation is based
on twin justifications of efficiency and democracy
and is a matter of "fundamental values," but he
does not go on to address whether regulating
cyberspace implicates other fundamental values. 112 He dodges away from exploring moral justifications for regulating cyberspace, on the basis
that morality is too "personal or private." ' 13 But
Lessig, seemingly dazzled by the law and economic theory that is so prevalent among American legal scholars, fails to consider whether there
may not be other values, more fundamental and
universal than efficiency, that form the basis for a
system of property rights. One approach that
would have merited further exploration is a
human rights approach to intellectual property
rights in cyberspace. Under this approach, property rights, including intellectual property rights,
are seen as essentially grounded in universal
human rights, namely the duality of the dignity of
the human person and the essentially social nature of humankind."' The proper balance of intellectual property rights must be one that, consistent with fundamental human rights, serves the
common good. 115 The same requirement should
be applicable to the question of the extent to
which society should foster innovation.
CONCLUSION

V.

Notwithstanding the speculative and prelimiU.S.C. §304(a) (2) (B) (2001). Lessig's proposal does not appear to countenance automatic renewal, so the old question

over the date of vesting of the renewal expectancy would
reemerge, causing uncertainty and fueling litigation.
112 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 11.
113 Id.
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Paul II, Message to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign, available
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nary nature of many of his arguments in The Future of Ideas, Lessig is clearly ready to do battle. His
battle cry is: "[d]inosaurs should die."'' 6 At the
moment it is not clear whether Lessig will succeed
in slaying some dinosaurs when the Supreme
Court rules in Eldred v. Ashcrof. Nor, given the
host of questions and concerns set out above, is it
entirely clear that he should succeed. Lessig's
book has not yet convinced this reader that the
116

See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 176.
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invisible hand of the market will fail to strangle
the dinosaurs without any intervention, or that
the market will ultimately fail to protect the Internet's e2e design. Nevertheless, Lessig's crusading work is clearly a significant contribution to the
debate over how the Internet should be regulated. It warrants careful study and thoughtful debate.

